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Abstract
For Amartya Sen, Adam Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator is a device that brings 
“distant voices” into our moral deliberations in order to prevent us from the parochialism 
that can limit our views on particular issues. Whilst recognising its importance, this 
article suggests that there are some problems with the way Sen uses this in his The Idea 
of Justice. Tensions arise around issues relating to his interpretation of Smith, a one-sided 
and undialectical understanding of the operation of the impartial spectator, an ambivalence 
in Sen’s approach between essentialism and cultural relativism, the capacity for people to 
carry out the demands of the impartial spectator and its efficacy in relation to real moral 
problems such as Smith’s case of infanticide. The conclusion is that in the search for 
openness, Sen leaves his idea of justice with insufficient grounding to forge a dialogue that 
can act as a challenge to entrenched beliefs rather than simply accept them in a limbo of 
fragile co-existence.
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Introduction
In Amartya Sen’s monumental The Idea of Justice, one of the bedrocks of what he 
considers to be crucial for dialogue in our moral and political deliberations is Adam 
Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator.1 For Sen, what this device brings to our practical 
reasoning about what is just or unjust are “distant voices” that we need to take into account 
if we are to reach an objective judgement over a particular issue. To this end, I offer a 
critical assessment of Sen’s use of Smith’s framework to try and tease out some problems 
and ambiguities that appear to be present in his normative discourse. I begin by outlining 
how Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator fits into Sen’s theory, and then I offer a 
discussion of “distant voices” that can challenge or raise problems for his own position, in 
the sense he is trying to do in his search for objectivity. Finally I explore a famous example 
from Smith that Sen considers, infanticide, which illustrates the way in which the impartial 
spectator can be utilised, but also the problems it can raise for trying to create a platform 
on which to engage in dialogue for a better world.
I
The Impartial Spectator
One of Sen’s central concerns in The Idea of Justice is the way that people can 
participate in “public dialogue” and “unrestricted public deliberation,” because they 
are  “quite central to democratic politics in general and to the pursuit of social justice 
in particular.”2 For Sen, reason is crucial in this process because it allows people to 
make ethical judgements, but this does not rule out the role of emotions within such 
deliberations.3 Indeed, he sees reason and emotion playing “complimentary roles in 
human reflection.” When we engage in such reasoning, Sen contends that we have to 
be as objective as we possibly can to help us think about issues of justice and injustice,4 
which implies the need for impartiality in our deliberations.5 He also suggests that “by and 
large” everyone has the capacity for reasonableness by being open minded about receiving 
  1 Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (London: Penguin, 2010).
  2 Ibid., 43-44.
  3 Ibid., 39.
  4 Ibid., 39-40.
  5 Ibid., 42.
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information and reflecting on different arguments from different people, while also 
engaging in “interactive deliberations and debates on how the underlying issues should be 
seen.”6
A crucial feature of this process for Sen is Adam Smith’s notion of the “impartial 
spectator,” because it acts as a resource for allowing us to think about the role of objectivity 
in the assessment of justice.7 For Sen, Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator is “a 
thought-experiment that asked what would a particular practice or procedure look like to a 
disinterested person – from far or near.”8 Sen sees this as a “dialectical device to question 
and dispute commonly held beliefs,”9 and is meant to “open up questioning, rather than 
close down a debate with a formulaic answer allegedly derived from the impartial spectator 
seen as a definitive arbitrator.”10 As such, Sen continues, it raises many relevant questions, 
is “part of the discipline of impartial reasoning,” and it is in that way the idea is used in his 
book.
Sen states that we must follow Smith’s edict that we “‘have to examine our own 
conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it’.”11 In doing 
so, we follow Smith’s main motivation to “broaden our understanding and to widen the 
reach of our ethical inquiry.”12 One way in which we do so, Sen contends, is explained by 
Smith as follows:
In solitude, we are apt to feel too strongly whatever relates to ourselves . . . The 
conversation of a friend brings us to a better temper. The man within the breast, 
the abstract and ideal spectator of our sentiments and conduct, requires often to be 
awakened and put in mind of his duty, by the presence of the real spectator: and it 
is always from that spectator, from whom we can expect the least sympathy and 
indulgence, that we are likely to learn the most complete lesson of self-command.13
  6 Ibid., 43.
  7 Ibid., 44.
  8 Ibid., 404.
  9 Ibid., 125, fn*.
10 Ibid., 404, fn*.
11 Ibid., 124. Quoting Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (London: Penguin, 2009), III. I. 2.
12 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 125.
13 Ibid. Quoting Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III. 3. 38.
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Interestingly, Sen also notes that “even though Smith often refers to the impartial spectator 
as the ‘man within the breast’,” it is the broadening out of the assessment and judgement 
that is the crucial aspect of his “intellectual strategy.” This is why Sen thinks that Smith’s 
impartial spectator can be considered as a “pioneering idea in the enterprise of interpreting 
impartiality and formulating the demands of fairness which so engaged the world of the 
European Enlightenment.”14 Sen cites Condorcet and Kant as being influenced by Smith in 
this respect.
For Sen, Smith is therefore invoking the “reflective device” of the impartial spectator 
to make us think beyond our narrow concerns and see how they would look from a 
distance. He then offers a long quotation to justify what he sees as Smith’s “procedure of 
open impartiality” as follows:
We can never survey our own sentiments and motives, we can never form any 
judgement concerning them; unless we remove ourselves, as it were, from our own 
natural station, and endeavour to view them as at a certain distance from us. But we 
can do this in no other way than by endeavouring to view them with the eyes of other 
people, or as other people are likely to view them.15
Sen deduces from this that “Smithian reasoning not only admits but requires consideration 
of the views of others who are far as well as near.”16
Sen explains this further by stressing how resolving matters of injustice through public 
reasoning means that we must include contributions from everyone whose assessments 
are relevant to the issue. This means people who might have an interest in the matter 
as well as those who can make enlightened contributions on the judgements being 
proffered, which can be missed if different perspectives are not allowed to be included. 
Smith’s value, according to Sen, is the way he allows the discussion to be broadened and 
overcome any parochialism that might pertain in a particular culture.17 The invocation 
of the impartial spectator means that we need to ask what someone from a distance 
would say about a particular issue and so allow us to critically examine the influence of 
any vested interests along with the impact of tradition or custom that could undermine 
14 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 124.
15 Ibid., 125. Quoting Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III. I. 2.
16 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 126.
17 Ibid., 44-45.
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objectivity.18 Such objectivity is therefore linked either directly or indirectly to the ability 
to survive scrutinizing challenges from different perspectives, which Sen sees as essential 
in relation to our political and ethical convictions. However, he then adds the caveat that 
any principles that survive such an examination should not be treated as a “unique set.”19 
This is because there could be competing positions that persist and do not fit into one 
form of resolution that can then be accommodated institutionally and implemented by a 
sovereign state, as is the case in John Rawls’ theory that Sen describes as “transcendental 
institutionalism.” Despite such a difference with Rawls’ approach, Sen maintains that there 
is a commonality here based on the “need for reasoned encounter on an impartial basis.”20 
Sen realises that reasons of justice can differ due to the Smithian notion of ‘“self-love”’ 
and also due to prudence, but concludes that “reasons of justice still constitute a large 
expanse.”21
On this basis, Sen contrasts the previously mentioned open impartiality, which he 
derives from Smith, with the closed impartiality he associates with Rawls’ approach 
because it implies that only the members of a society or nation are involved in making 
impartial judgements.22 For Rawls this is based on an original position from which a social 
contract emerges that is shared among the citizens of a particular political community. 
Open impartiality involves making impartial assessments and judgements from outside the 
primary group to overcome any parochialism that may be present, and Sen cites Smith for 
support again.23 Such impartial viewpoints can emanate from afar and within a particular 
culture, society or nation, but, the main point is that there is a need for both. However, he 
will contradict himself on this matter as we shall see later.
Sen’s emphasis on open impartiality and its importance for moving us beyond narrow 
concerns that permeate a position of closed impartiality, inevitably makes him reject those 
approaches that confine deliberations to the members of a sovereign state, such as Rawls 
and contractarian theory in general.24
Sen contends that there are major differences but also significant similarities between 
the closed impartiality of the social contract and the open impartiality of the impartial 
18 Ibid., 45.
19 Ibid., 45-46.
20 Ibid., 46.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 122.
23 Ibid., 123.
24 Ibid., 128-29.
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spectator.25 This leads him to investigate Rawls’ discussion of the impartial spectator in 
his A Theory of Justice26 to try to answer the question of whether the impartial spectator 
can be a viable approach to moral or political assessment without being either directly or 
indirectly parasitic on some version of closed impartiality such as contractarianism. Sen 
argues that Rawls perceives this as a possibility, but is mistaken in doing so because Smith 
explicitly rejected utilitarian arguments and required his impartial spectator to go beyond 
the closed impartiality present within a social contract.27
Sen notes that there are three particular problems to the restrictions of Rawls and 
social contract theory. The first is that it narrows our obligations to those who are 
outside our “neighbourhood” and so weakens any theory of justice.28 Sen refers to this as 
“exclusionary neglect,” where closed impartiality excludes those who are not part of the 
focal group but whose lives will be affected by the decisions of that group.29 In this case, 
Sen considers the contrast between international and global justice and shows how Smith’s 
impartial spectator can enlighten this issue.30 Sen notes how Rawls attempts to extend the 
original position by making it both intranational, which covers people within a nation, and 
international, which relates to people of different nations. In this way, even though both 
aspects are instances of closed impartiality, together they encompass the entire world in 
the search for justice. However, Sen finds this “deeply unrealistic” and not on the agenda 
“now or in the foreseeable future.”31 Moreover, dividing the world into nations or peoples 
ignores the further divisions that arise due to interpersonal relations that occur in relation to 
cross-border effects of human action. Sen cites the operations of transnational corporations 
as an example of this because they operate without borders and so do not fit into the one 
nation or people model.32 Similarly, Sen continues, our relations to one another in terms 
of concern and duty can also transcend the restrictions of operating through the auspices 
of the nation state, as in the case, say, of a feminist who identifies with the oppression of 
women in another part of the world. What is driving the feminist is her relation to other 
25 Ibid., 136.
26 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 183-92.
27 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 136-37. Citing Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, VII. ii. 2. 14 and Rawls, A 
Theory of Justice, 22-23, fn, 9.
28 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 129.
29 Ibid., 138.
30 Ibid., 140.
31 Ibid., 141.
32 Ibid., 142.
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women rather than her citizenship and her viewpoint could be introduced as part of being 
an exercise in “open impartiality.”
Sen contends that other identities based on class, language and so on can serve as a 
basis for the operation of “open impartiality” that again go beyond the remit of nation 
states. Even global protests need not be confined to international relations or by Rawls’ 
‘“law of peoples’” and doing so, Sen suggests, results in a “tyranny of ideas.”33 If we 
also consider the issue of human rights, these cannot be understood on the basis of the 
citizenship of one country, but instead are based on claims open to every human being 
throughout the world.34 Consequently, Smith’s impartial spectator allows us to overcome 
these problems of “exclusionary neglect.”35
The second is what Sen calls “inclusionary incoherence,” where inconsistencies 
can emerge in closing the membership of a group, where the decisions taken by any 
focal group can have an impact on the composition or size of that group.36 In this case, 
“the members of the focal group have a status in the contractarian exercise that non-
members do not enjoy.”37 For Sen, public policies can alter the size and composition of the 
population of a specific group, which can also be subject to change through “marriages, 
mating, cohabitation, and other parameters of reproduction.” Moreover, the fact that the 
focal group is involved in choosing the basic structure of society means that the group 
will be influenced by that choice itself, and trying to limit the group for closed impartiality 
can lead to incoherence. Sen argues that Smith’s impartial spectator means that such 
incoherence is avoided because the latter comes from without the group rather than within 
it. “Indeed, Smith’s ‘abstract and ideal spectator’ is a ‘spectator’ and not a ‘participant’ in 
any exercise like a group-based contract.”38 Moreover, there is no contracting group and 
it is not necessary that the “evaluators must be congruent with the affected group.” Sen 
admits that there is still a problem of how the impartial spectator could make decisions on 
a fluctuating population size, which Sen sees as an “ethical issue of profound complexity,” 
but maintains that the problem of incoherence and incongruity does not apply in the case of 
the impartial spectator.
33 Ibid., 143.
34 Ibid., 143-44.
35 Ibid., 144.
36 Ibid., 139.
37 Ibid., 145.
38 Ibid., 149.
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The third, “procedural parochialism,” relates to Smith’s concern over the lack of a 
consideration of views from outside, “distant voices,”39 where the biases and prejudices of 
the focal group are not addressed. Sen argues that the point here is not that these distant 
voices have to be taken into account just because they are there. Rather, it is because the 
path to objectivity “demands serious scrutiny” and an appreciation of “different viewpoints 
from elsewhere, reflecting the influence of other empirical experiences.”40 The importance 
of these different views for Sen is that they pose a question even if that question may turn 
out to be wrong or inadequate in some way once it has been reflected upon. The danger 
of parochialism is that such reflection may seem unnecessary because the beliefs people 
have become common sense. Indeed, local preferences in making social judgements are 
seen as perfectly legitimate and in some cases to be of paramount importance, he cites 
some versions of communitarianism for doing this. Additionally, Sen notes how even the 
procedure of Rawls’ original position has limited exposure to outside views, something that 
Rawls himself sees as a positive aspect of his theory because it is “‘free from distracting 
details’.”41 However, for Sen, Rawls is begging the question of whether these “‘distracting 
details’” could be relevant, rather than rejected in order to preserve the “purity of the 
exercise of fairness.”42
Sen sees the open impartiality arising from the impartial spectator as offering a 
“liberating role” that allows “unprejudiced and unbiased perspectives” to inform a 
particular issue and a recognition that there may be no overall agreed decision on what is 
the right course of action to take. Sen therefore suggests that we do not need to demarcate 
clear orderings for what is just or unjust so that a
. . . common resolve to fight for the abolition of famines, or genocide, or terrorism, or 
slavery, or untouchability, or illiteracy, or epidemics, etc., does not require that there be 
a similarly extensive agreement on the appropriate formulae for inheritance rights, or 
income tax schedules, or levels of minimum wages, or copyright laws.43
39 Ibid., 407.
40 Ibid.
41 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 150. Citing John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005), 12.
42 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 151.
43 Ibid., 145.
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Sen contends that this is due to recognising human diversity across the world and open 
impartiality engendered by the impartial spectator is crucial in this process. So Sen’s 
emphasis on openness and recognition of human diversity means that a common policy of 
achieving justice needs to accommodate the culturally specific or particular situation of a 
particular country. He declares, slightly defensively, that “there is nothing defeatist in this 
recognition.”44
Finally, Sen considers a problem for the claim of open impartiality in general because 
the objection could be made that the human mind might be too limited to allow ourselves to 
go beyond our local concerns. Sen again cites versions of communitarian separatism as an 
example of this, but concludes that “there is no particular reason to presume that interactive 
communication and public engagement can be sought only within such boundaries (or 
within the confines of those who can be seen as ‘one people’).”45 Sen argues that for 
Adam Smith, the “impartial spectator could draw on the understanding of people who are 
far as well as those who are near.”46 So the idea that we cannot communicate or lack the 
cognitive ability to do so beyond our local communities and groupings is “no more absurd 
today than it was in Smith’s eighteenth-century world.”47 In this way, and despite the fact 
that we do not have global democracy or even a global state, Sen contends that Smith’s 
“impartial spectator has immediate implications for the role of global public discussion in 
the contemporary world.”48
Sen then argues that global dialogue, which is crucial for global justice, comes from 
myriad institutions ranging from the United Nations or the World Trade Organisation in 
particular, but more generally through the media, political agitation, citizens’ organisations 
and NGO’s (Non-Governmental Organization’s), trade unions, cooperative operations, 
human rights campaigns and feminist groups. Such a global understanding of our 
predicament is even further enhanced by the global response to terrorism and to the global 
economic crisis that is blighting the lives of millions of people throughout the world.49 
Consequently, Sen concludes that such a response necessitates a re-affirmation of Smith’s 
impartial spectator to make us engage with the issue of impartiality in relation to moral 
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid., 151.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid., 151-52
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and political philosophy in the globalised world we live in.50 Indeed, this all ties in with the 
very reasonable way Sen approaches issues of justice and would seem to be a benefit of his 
theory. However, some problems do arise with this approach as we shall see in the next section.
II
Distant Voices
For Sen as we have seen, in Smith’s impartial spectator approach the “distant voices” 
are given prominence for their relevance on a particular issue. So following Sen’s logic we 
need to apply the objectivity and enlightenment of some “distant voices” to his own theory.
To begin with, we first need to focus on Sen’s claim to be using Smith’s impartial 
spectator as a “dialectical device.” One problem that arises for Sen here is that he seems to 
misinterpret what Smith says about the impartial spectator exhibiting two forms: the “ideal 
spectator” and the “real spectator.”51 Sen loses his dialectical approach by overemphasising 
the real spectator to the detriment of the ideal spectator. This is evinced in his comment 
earlier that “even though” Smith refers to the impartial spectator as the “man within 
the breast,” Sen sees the broadening out aspect as the most important part of the moral 
deliberative process. So the dialectical interplay he quite rightly identified is lost and the 
nuanced nature of the two forms of the impartial spectator is missed. To understand this 
correctly one has to be aware of Smith’s starting point for moral deliberations.
Smith argues that “first perceptions, as well as all other experiments upon which any 
general rules are founded, cannot be the object of reason, but of immediate sense and 
feeling.”52 As such, Smith is seen as contributing to the empiricist, anti-rationalist approach 
to ethics of his precursors, Francis Hutcheson and David Hume, who maintained that the 
passions are at the basis of morality and moral judgements.53 So moral truths cannot be 
deduced by logic from obvious assumptions or known innately.54 The impartial spectator 
then fits into this by being “especially concerned with moral judgements about one’s own 
actions.”55 Whereas Hutcheson and Hume limited their investigations to account for the 
50 Ibid., 152.
51 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III. 3. 38.
52 Ibid., VII. iii. 2. 7. Cf. Jeffrey T. Young, “Natural Morality and the Ideal Impartial Spectator in Adam Smith,” 
International Journal of Social Economics 19, no. 10/11/12 (1992): 73.
53 Young, “Natural Morality and the Ideal Impartial Spectator in Adam Smith,” 73.
54 Ibid.
55 D. D. Raphael, The Impartial Spectator. Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 5.
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decisions made about other people’s actions, Smith internalised the theory and developed 
it to make it a “theory of conscience.”56 So the starting point for any moral deliberations is 
within the individual who is confronted by two forms of the impartial spectator that stops 
us from, as Smith says, feeling “too strongly whatever relates to ourselves.”57 Relating to 
ourselves in moral deliberations is therefore our starting point, according to Smith, but 
to make such deliberations we need to confront ourselves with the “ideal spectator” on 
one side, and the “real spectator” on the other side. As Jeffrey Young indicates, both of 
these spectators are impartial but the evaluations that accrue from the real spectator offer 
the “static criteria by which a society evaluates itself.”58 This is a “higher standard of 
judgement; the individual’s conscience.”59 However, this “higher standard” can only be 
reached through a dialectical interplay of moral deliberation.
Despite this anomaly, Sen attempts to re-assert his dialectical approach in a discussion 
of Simon Blackburn’s analysis of Smith’s impartial spectator. Sen notes how Blackburn has 
interpreted Smith’s use of the impartial spectator to develop a “‘common point of view’.”60 
Sen responds to this claim by certainly agreeing that such an interpretation is possible but 
contends, as we saw earlier, that “Smith also uses that thought-experiment as a dialectical 
device to question and dispute commonly agreed beliefs.”61 In this way, Sen suggests that 
this second use is important even if no “common point of view” emerges. However, there 
are two problems here. The first is that Sen does not seem to be following his own edict 
of understanding closed and open impartiality in a dialectical interplay because he slips 
into overemphasising open against closed. Yet, it is not a matter of open versus closed 
impartiality but a consideration of both, which he initially correctly realised. On the one 
hand is the “‘man within the breast”’ the “‘ideal spectator’” that is concerned solely with 
what relates to ourselves, and on the other side is the “‘real spectator’” that makes us 
think beyond ourselves. One compliments the other in, what is, as Sen pointed out above, 
a dialectical interplay, rather than a one-sided reductionism to open impartiality. Smith is 
recognising that when we are faced with ethical dilemmas our starting point is normally 
56 Young, “Natural Morality and the Ideal Impartial Spectator in Adam Smith,” 73, drawing on D. D. Raphael, 
“The Impartial Spectator,” in Essays on Adam Smith, eds. Andrew S. Skinner and Thomas Wilson (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975).
57 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III. 3. 38.
58 Young, “Natural Morality and the Ideal Impartial Spectator in Adam Smith,” 73.
59 Ibid.
60 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 125, fn*, citing Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).
61 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 125, fn*.
??????????????????? ???????????? ??????????
58   Ian Fraser
related to ourselves, what Sen calls closed impartiality, but a proper moral deliberation 
must also be confronted with the outside viewpoint, the open impartiality that Sen is so 
keen on. Indeed, even the term “closed impartiality” might be seen as unhelpful, because it 
is not always completely closed anyway. It lacks the recognition that even the most “closed” 
mind can be confronted with doubts and subconscious challenges that would disturb the 
certainty of their own moral actions.
A second problem is that Sen has misinterpreted Blackburn who explains the notion 
of the “common point of view” through his own interpretation of Smith via Hume.62 For 
Blackburn, the “common point of view” refers to a “sensitivity,” a “restless . . . duty of 
self-scrutiny that is present in Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’ within the breast.”63 It is the 
second part of what Blackburn refers to as a “four-part” process in moral deliberation.64 
The first is to love a particular quality in another person, the second, the “common point of 
view,” is taken up as it turns this love into “esteem.” The third turns us inward to make us 
aware whether we exhibit this trait or not. The fourth is when this awareness then leads to 
“self-satisfaction and pride, or unease and shame,” which relates to our original assessment 
and “imagining this assessment made of us by others.”65 Blackburn refers to this as “a 
kind of internal vibration in sympathy with the imagined sentiments of others.”66 What 
Blackburn finds original in this formulation is not the self-scrutiny aspect but the “stress 
on the social aspect, so that self-scrutiny is a matter of internalising the gaze of others.”67 
The “common point of view” is making a judgement about whether a particular action or 
trait should be praised or not. For Blackburn, then, the “capacity to take up the impartial 
point of view remains possible, even when on occasion we are unable to rise to it.”68 It is 
not therefore clear that Blackburn is, as Sen contends, discounting the dialectical interplay 
to dispute commonly held beliefs. The “common point of view” is not commonly held 
beliefs; it is the way in which we determine the good or bad of an action or in Smith’s own 
words, reported by Blackburn:
62 Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, 200-01. Citing Smith, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, III. 2. 33.
63 Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, 200-01.
64 Ibid., 201.
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid., 202.
68 Ibid.
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The jurisdiction of the man within is founded altogether in the desire of praise-
worthiness, and in the aversion to blame-worthiness; in the desire of possessing those 
qualities, and performing those actions, which we love and admire in other people; and 
in the dread of possessing those qualities, and performing those actions, which we hate 
and despise in other people.69
So Sen seems to have misread Blackburn quite badly here because the process does 
not imply a definitive outcome even though for Blackburn, and it seems for Smith, that 
definitive outcome would be desirable, for Sen that is not as clear. The way Blackburn 
reads Smith is as a defender and a member of the “party of humanity,” and the appeal to the 
“‘man within the breast’” who is “representing the absent people without” is part of that 
common humanity.70 So this interrogative process of self-scrutiny does not imply common 
opinion in the sense that Sen suggests but an appeal to common humanity. Unfortunately 
for Sen, he slips into a form of cultural relativism that undermines this appeal even though 
he feels at liberty to invoke it himself at times when he so desires to ground his idea of 
justice, as in the case of his preference for universal human rights, for example. Moreover, 
this appeal to our common humanity is part of how Smith responds to trying to get 
agreement with someone over a particular issue which in the end amounts to, as Blackburn 
states, “throw[ing] our shoulders behind an ideal of civility, even if we understand that it 
has no transcendental backing.”71
We can now turn to Sen’s contention earlier that we do not need to demarcate orderings 
of what is just or unjust. The examples he uses above, as “common:” opposition to slavery, 
genocide, terrorism, etc., do not relate to the specific examples of the policies he then 
outlines, such as inheritance rights, income tax schedules, minimum wages, etc., which 
makes them look as though they might not be agreed upon and so support his claim that we 
do not need to demarcate what is just or unjust. Yet the common goal to abolish slavery, 
for example, does require some form of consensus on the best way that can be achieved 
if individual nations are to be bound by this goal. This can be encapsulated in the human 
rights argument that Sen made earlier. Those nations allowing such practices to exist can 
then be held to account for doing so. Slavery can be clearly marked therefore as an unjust 
practice and a common policy enshrined in human rights endorsed to stop such a practice. 
69 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, III. 2. 33, quoted by Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of 
Practical Reasoning, 200.
70 Blackburn, Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning, 230.
71 Ibid., 263.
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It is as though Sen is privileging freedom over all other factors, and indeed this is a 
criticism that Martha Nussbaum has levelled at him in relation to the Capabilities Approach 
which also has import here.72
Nussbaum first notes that although Sen focuses on the way capabilities are used 
comparatively, as he is doing here with the issue of what is just or unjust, he also, when 
examining real societies, identifies certain capabilities as being “more important than 
others,” such as: “health, education, political participation, non-discrimination on the basis 
of race, religion, and gender.” So he is committing himself to a notion of basic justice. 
Yet Nussbaum also suggests that Sen’s emphasis on maximising freedom allows him to 
speak as if all capabilities were of value on that basis.73 However, for Nussbaum this goes 
against the possibility of saying anything substantial about justice if we do not stipulate 
those capabilities that are needed to give “people the preconditions of a life worthy of 
human dignity”74 and which she does with her list of ten central capabilities.75 She thinks 
that if we are to achieve social justice these ten capabilities should be defended and act as 
a basis for articulating political principles that frame a “set of fundamental constitutional 
entitlements” that should be linked to “law and nation-building.”76 For Sen, of course, as 
Nussbaum observes, the emphasis is on seeing freedom as an overall good and leaving 
nation states to decide the specific capabilities that should be constitutionally protected. 
In that way, the democratic choices of these states is therefore being respected. Nussbaum 
concurs with the latter and states that it is illegitimate to impose anything on democratic 
nations from without, but her policy is based not on imposition, but on “persuasion, and 
the issue of implementation is a distinct one.”77 Nevertheless, she maintains that to simply 
offer the possibility of freedom as Sen does results in a number of problems.
First, Nussbaum suggests that there are doubts as to whether promoting freedom can 
offer coherence as a political project. She gives the examples of how the freedom for rich 
people to donate to political parties can undermine the equal value of the right to vote, or 
how the freedom of industry to pollute the environment can limit the freedom of those who 
wish to live free from such pollution. Nussbaum admits that these freedoms are not the 
72 Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), 70-71. Thanks to Tony Burns for alerting me to this critique.
73 Ibid., 70.
74 Ibid., 73,
75 Ibid., 33-34.
76 Ibid., 71.
77 Ibid.
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ones that Sen considers but concludes that “he says nothing to limit the account of freedom 
or to rule out such conflicts.”78 In addition, Sen ignores the fact that intrinsic to very idea 
of freedom is constraint, because the freedom to do a particular action will always be 
dependent on not being interfered with by other people when enacting it.79
Second, Nussbaum argues that even if such a project was coherent it is not something 
that a person endorsing a capabilities approach should endorse.80 She emphasises that 
the capabilities approach implies that to protect the liberties and rights of the poor, for 
example, means saying “forthrightly that some freedoms are central for political purposes, 
and some are distinctly not.”81 Sen cannot do this because he is pinned to his emphasis 
on open impartiality and the diversity of implementation of any policy of justice within 
each nation state. For our purpose, it seems as though he is also falling back into the state-
centred approach that he is so critical about in relation to Rawls. His open impartiality 
argument based on the impartial spectator as someone enlightening the issue of justice 
from afar and outside, becomes lost once we see the implementation of such an aim within 
the nation state.
Finally, the crucial issue of whether we have the capacity to do what the impartial 
spectator demands of us must also be addressed. As we saw earlier, Sen thinks everyone 
can meet this demand because the human mind can allow us to go beyond our local 
concerns but there can be doubts cast on this as D. D. Raphael now explains.
Raphael sees Smith’s theory of the impartial spectator as being a “sociological and 
psychological explanation of some moral capacities.”82 Consequently, the “concept of 
the impartial spectator is especially concerned with moral judgements about one’s own 
actions.”83 Smith is therefore “presenting a hypothesis of the actual causal processes 
whereby judgements of conscience are formed.”84 For Raphael, this means that Smith 
sees “conscience to be a second self built up in the mind as a reflection of the attitudes 
of outside persons.”85 So his theory was “meant to provide a satisfactory alternative to 
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., 71-72.
80 Ibid., 72.
81 Ibid.
82 Raphael, The Impartial Spectator. Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy, 47.
83 Ibid., 4.
84 Ibid., 48.
85 Ibid.
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rationalist a priori accounts of conscience and morality generally.”86 Although Smith was, 
along with Hutcheson and Hume, a “good empiricist,” where he differed with them was 
that they could not “account for the peculiarities of conscience” and his impartial spectator 
was one way he could do that.
However, Raphael is critical of the complexity of Smith’s hypothesis because he thinks 
his “concept of the impartial spectator is too complicated to be acceptable when one works 
it out fully in terms of his general theory of approval.”87 Raphael explains this complexity 
in the following way. He states that if Smith is correct then an ordinary spectator will 
approve of an agent’s actions if he imagines himself to be in the same predicament and act 
in the same manner.88 The agent, on the other hand, once conscience has been consulted, 
has to imagine that they are an impartial and uninvolved spectator, while also being aware 
of the facts of the particular issue.89 So the agent imagines him or herself to be the impartial 
spectator and the impartial spectator has to imagine him or herself as the agent. Once this 
is done the agent then has to ask him or herself whether the feelings he or she actually 
feels now would correspond to the feeling he or she imagines they would correspond to. 
Raphael concludes that while the “process is not impossible,” “it seems too complicated 
to be a common experience.”90 I now want to examine one of the main examples that Sen 
uses from Smith to try to show the efficacy of the impartial spectator for his idea of justice 
and that is the practice of infanticide.
III
Infanticide
Sen notes how Smith was particularly concerned to apply his theory to jurisprudence 
and moral and political reasoning and cites the issue of infanticide as a case in point at the 
end of The Idea of Justice.91 He offers a long quotation from Smith on the issue as follows:
86 Ibid., 49.
87 Ibid., 51.
88 Ibid., 51-52.
89 Ibid., 52.
90 Ibid.
91 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 404.
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The murder of new-born infants was a practice allowed of in almost all the states 
of Greece, even among the polite and civilized Athenians; and whenever the 
circumstances of the parent rendered it inconvenient to bring up the child, to abandon it 
to hunger, or to wild beasts, was regarded without blame or censure . . . Uninterrupted 
custom had by this time so thoroughly authorised the practice, that not only the loose 
maxims of the world tolerated this barbarous prerogative, but even the doctrine of 
philosophers, which ought to have been more just and accurate, was led away by the 
established custom, and upon this as upon many other occasions, instead of censuring, 
supported the horrible abuse, by far-fetched considerations of public utility. Aristotle 
talks of it as what the magistrate ought upon on many occasions to encourage. The 
humane Plato is of the same opinion, and, with all that love of mankind which seems 
to animate all his writings, nowhere marks this practice with disapprobation.92
For Sen, Smith is drawing attention to the fact that ancient Athenians, even Plato and 
Aristotle, condoned infanticide while being unaware that in other societies such a 
practice was not in any way a necessity. For Sen, Smith’s example of infanticide is still, 
unfortunately, relevant today albeit only in a few societies, although many of his other 
examples apply to a wide number of contemporary societies.93 This also applies, Sen 
continues, to Smith’s demand that “‘the eyes of the rest of mankind’ must be invoked 
to understand whether ‘a punishment appears equitable’.”94 Sen supposes that even the 
hanging of “‘miscreants’” seemed to be perfectly acceptable to the “enforcers of order and 
decency in the American South, not very long ago.”95 Sen then gives a number of examples 
from today where he thinks Smith’s “scrutiny from a ‘distance’” can be useful to assess 
and judge particular acts. These are: “the stoning of adulterous women in the Taliban’s 
Afghanistan, selective abortion of female foetuses in China, Korea and parts of India, and 
widespread use of capital punishment in China, or for that matter in the United States (with 
or without the celebratory public jubilations that are not entirely unknown in some parts 
of the country.”96 Sen therefore concludes that “closed impartiality lacks something of the 
quality that makes impartiality – and fairness – so central to the idea of justice.”97
92 Ibid. Citing Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, V. 2. 15.
93 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 404-05.
94 Ibid., 405. Citing Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, V. 2. 15.
95 Sen, The Idea of Justice, 405.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
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Sen argues that the supposed cogency of parochial values is often due to a lack of 
knowledge of what has been proved possible in the lives of other people.98 He points out 
that the defence of infanticide in ancient Greece that Smith discussed was influenced by 
a lack of knowledge of other societies where this is not performed and does not lead to 
chaos or crisis. So while parochial knowledge is important, global knowledge can inform 
local practices and debates. However, Sen is keen to add that listening to “distant voices,” 
which is the demand of Smith’s impartial spectator, does not mean they should always 
be respected or accepted. They can be rejected partly or totally but they may contain 
aspects of reasoning to make us question what could be deeply held beliefs. Even where 
arguments can initially appear “‘outlandish’,” they may still have an important part to play 
in our moral deliberations. Sen considers how those in China or the USA may not want to 
consider why other countries do not practice capital punishment as they do, but “if reasons 
are important” then he thinks there should be a “strong case” for examining arguments 
from elsewhere that reject such a practice.
As we have seen, this concern with distant voices can be a useful source for objective 
reasoning, according to Sen. He adds that these people are not acting as arbitrators but as 
people who can offer a “less partial understanding of the ethics and justice of a problem.”99 
For Sen, then, the Smithian “impartial spectator” is a “device for critical scrutiny and 
public discussion” and does “not, therefore, seek unanimity or total agreement in the way 
that the institutional straitjacket of Rawlsian theory of justice demands.”100 Consequently, 
for Sen, his own emphasis on the “demands for reasoned practice” can “live with a good 
deal of incompleteness or unresolved conflicts.”101 So the “agreement to emerge from a 
‘public framework of thought’ can be of a partial but useful kind.”102
Sen’s openness here is in one sense to be commended but in another sense raises 
further doubts about the efficacy of his idea of justice. It certainly fits a number of 
examples quite well where the morality of an act cannot be decided either way. The 
infanticide issue, though, is an interesting case. The way Sen interprets Smith on this is 
that his appeal to the impartial spectator allows him to offer the “reasoned practice” that 
such an act is morally wrong because it did not take place in cultures outside ancient Greek 
98 Ibid., 407.
99 Ibid., 131.
100 Ibid., 135.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
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society. As Sen stipulates, it was not in any way a necessity and he states it is unfortunate 
that it is still present today. However, when we go back to Smith’s example Sen misses out 
the discussion Smith has about the origins of the practice.
Smith surmises that the practice of infanticide probably originated in “times of the 
most savage barbarity” and even in his day where the “practice prevails among all savage 
nations; and in that rudest and lowest state of society it is undoubtedly more pardonable 
than in any other.”103 Smith then concludes that infanticide in such societies “ought not 
to surprise us too greatly” because of the existence of the “greatest extremity of hunger” 
where people often die of “pure want.”104 He condemns the practice in Greek society 
because “views of remote interest or conveniency . . . could by no means excuse it.”105 
So for Smith, the fact that infanticide is a “custom” matters not, because custom “should 
never pervert our sentiments with regard to the general style and character of conduct and 
behaviour.”106 Infanticide, then for Smith, is a universal wrong, even if at times its practice 
can be understood.
Sen seems to think along similar lines judging by his comments above but this again 
goes against his own edict that we cannot clearly demarcate just and unjust acts. Sen 
and his exemplar Smith do so in this instance, but in Sen’s case his openness to allow 
competing perspectives to exist ultimately undermines such a claim. It comes back to the 
contradictions between Sen’s moments of essentialism that become undermined by his 
cultural relativism. Indeed, in this case the “distant voices” if heard, one presumes, would 
have told the ancient Greeks that in their “civilised” society the practice of infanticide was 
not in any way a necessity, but what, we might ask, of the “civilised” society that Smith 
was living in? Infanticide was practiced by many poor women out of the necessity that he 
sees as pardonable but which was punished in law with hanging.107 Their circumstances 
would in no way allow them to be able to listen to the impartial spectator that they do 
things differently elsewhere and there is no need for such a practice. Sen seems to think 
modernity will allow such reflection but necessity is still with us in the globalised world.
We are therefore left at the end of The Idea of Justice with a certain elusiveness 
that Sen thinks is a strength but at the same time wants to ground in the reasoning of the 
103 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, V. 2. 15.
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Peter Linebaugh, The London Hanged: Crime and Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (London: Allen 
Lane, 1991), 148-49.
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impartial spectator. It seems though that Smith would be less reluctant to do so than Sen. 
Smith is looking for moral absolutes through his impartial spectator and the idea that he 
does not want universal agreement or unanimity on moral issues seems unconvincing, as 
the case of infanticide suggests.
Moreover, the test of the resilience of Sen’s idea of justice meets severe challenges 
when faced with certain practices that it would be difficult for an impartial spectator to 
penetrate, but should not be rejected as barbaric out of hand. The infanticide example 
admits to contextual moral ambiguity despite Smith’s universal edict that it is wrong. 
However, one of the examples that Sen offers above is the stoning of adulterous women by 
the Taliban in Afghanistan. Closed impartiality in this case will, as Sen realises, lack the 
quality that the impartiality of the spectator can bring to this practice, because it is unlikely 
the Taliban are going to change their view that such a practice is a universal wrong. 
However, that does not stop those of us outside, or even those who take the risk from inside 
that closed circle, saying so on the basis of our common humanity, as Smith’s impartial 
spectator would no doubt tell us to do. Whether Sen is willing to take that step because 
of his commitment to openness is unclear, but such a dialogue may be limited when it is 
confronted with realities of those who would rather not talk. Admittedly, this is one of the 
most difficult conversations for any theory of justice to have and it may seem uncharitable 
to chide Sen for not making it, but maybe Smith’s commitment to common humanity 
and an emphasis on conscience over custom could be a profitable path as a paradigm for 
goodness in a world of incompleteness.
Conclusion
The importance of Sen’s contribution to an idea of justice cannot be disputed. The way 
in which he tries to open up ourselves to be objective in our moral deliberations through 
Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator is certainly to be commended. However, what has 
hopefully been shown here is that doubts remain about his interpretation of Smith’s device, 
the ambiguities it brings into Sen’s approach in relation to moral and cultural relativism, 
and the problems that creates when trying to forge a better world. We need to hear the 
“distance voices” when we are confronted with a moral dilemma but not to the detriment 
of a dialectical interplay between the different forms of the spectator. Moreover, we also 
need the courage, while being perceptive to differences in custom, to give our best account 
about what we think is morally right or wrong. In that way, openness to dialogue does not 
turn into an evasion of what we think is morally correct, and instead can become a force 
for our common humanity.
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